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1
I.

Introduction

We hear much more about the heroism of St. Thomas Becket, the martyr-archbishop of
Canterbury, than we hear about the cause for which he made his stand. Becket’s laudable
courage overshadows the fact that he defied the English king over an issue which would give
pause to many modern ears: Becket contended that the clergy must have absolute immunity from
secular law in the area of criminal prosecution. It is no coincidence that the popular 1964 film
Becket recast the conflict between king and archbishop as a more palatable dispute about a priest
who had been punished without trial. In real life, Becket’s concern went far beyond due process.
The questions raised in his time about the clergy’s place in Christian society have resurfaced
recently in the aftermath of the scandal of clerical sexual abuse.
The earliest centuries of Christian history presumed that the clergy were subject to both
ecclesiastical and secular law, and that the punishment of crime was the purview of secular
authority. During the Gregorian reform movement in the eleventh century, the advocates of a
new ecclesiology argued for a clerical hierarchy which was not answerable to any secular power,
and the authority of the newly systematized canon law provided the basis for a clerical class
which was exclusively self-policing. Thomas Becket attempted to carry the Gregorian ideals of
ecclesiastical autonomy and priestly dignity to their logical conclusion by establishing clerical
immunity as a political reality; both in personal debate and later in his correspondence, he argued
that no secular authority was competent to impose trial or punishment on a member of the
ordained clergy. After his death, the English church succeeded in establishing much of the
immunity for which he had contended.
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II.

Legal status of the clergy in early Christian history

There was little precedent for clerical immunity from secular jurisdiction in the earliest
centuries of Christian history. For the most part, early Christian authors presumed that the
Christian, whether cleric or lay, would always have a dual status in temporal society and would
remain subject to secular law as well as ecclesiastical law.
In the New Testament, Jesus directed his followers to “repay to Caesar what belongs to
Caesar and to God what belongs to God,” implying the existence of different but legitimate
sovereignties.1 He claimed to be a king, yet he said that his kingdom was “not of this world.”2
More specifically, St. Paul encouraged civil obedience, in particular regarding taxation, and he
himself demonstrated cooperation with Roman law. Paul wrote in the context of a non-Christian
government, but he was not afraid to assert that all authority comes from God and that the pagan
ruler is “the servant of God to inflict wrath on the evildoer.”3 At times he relied on Roman rulers
and Roman laws to protect him from his enemies.4
As far as legal judgment was concerned, there was some warrant in the New Testament
for a judicial process internal to the Christian community. Paul reprimanded the Corinthians for
bringing civil lawsuits before unbelievers rather than settling their affairs among themselves:
“Do you not know that the holy ones will judge the world? If the world is to be judged by you,
are you unqualified for the lowest law courts? Do you not know that we will judge angels? Then
why not everyday matters?”5 However, the concept of the Church exercising its own authority in

1

Mt. 22:15-22, New American Bible, Revised Edition (Charlotte, NC: St. Benedict Press, 2011). All subsequent
biblical citations are from this edition.
2
Jn. 18:36.
3
Rom. 13:4.
4
Acts 22:25-29.
5
1 Cor. 6:2-3.
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a formal judicial setting, much less deploying coercive power to “inflict wrath on the evildoer,”
did not enter the conception of the New Testament writers.
Practically speaking, before the conversion of the Empire, Christians living in civil
society had no choice but to acknowledge themselves subject to two different jurisdictions: civil
law in matters such as taxation and crime, the Church in matters of moral conduct, truths of the
Faith, and sacramental worship. In particular, nothing was said to imply that the ordained clergy
stood any differently in relation to secular authority than did any other Christian.
The idea that the Church might have a privileged standing before the civil law could only
begin to develop when the Empire became an explicitly Christian government during the fourth
century. An anecdote recorded by Rufinus asserted that Constantine was sympathetic to the idea
that the clergy ought to answer only to divine authority. Rufinus wrote that at the Council of
Nicaea in 325, the bishops petitioned the emperor to adjudicate a dispute which had arisen
between them. Constantine refused: “God has appointed you priests and given you power to
judge even concerning us, and therefore we are rightly judged by you, while you cannot be
judged by men.”6 Whether or not the story is true, Constantine did absolve the clergy from
certain public obligations, but he did not put clerical immunity into law.7
Constantine’s successors laid down vacillating laws about the status of clerics in legal
proceedings. In general, the emperors were amenable to acknowledging the Church’s
competence in matters of sacramental discipline and at times even permitted its bishops to act as

6

Rufinus, Historia ecclesiastica, X.2, trans. Philip R. Amidon, in The Church History of Rufinus of Aquileia, Books
10 and 11 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 10.
7
Theodosian Code 16.2.1, in The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmondian Constitutions, trans. Clyde
Pharr (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952) (hereafter cited as TC). Constantine wrote to the proconsul
of Africa that the divine worship offered by the Christian clergy was already an “immense contribution to the
welfare of the community” and that they should be freed from mundane civil responsibilities for this duty. Eusebius,
Historia ecclesiastica, X.7, trans. G. A. Williamson, The History of the Church from Christ to Constantine
(Harmondsworth, UK: Dorset, 1965).
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judges and arbitrators in civil suits,8 but they were reluctant to grant ecclesiastical jurisdiction in
criminal proceedings.9 Clerics were nevertheless acknowledged as a unique class, and measures
were taken to respect their dignity — for example, a 452 law declared that although bishops were
not exempt from civil courts, they could defend themselves through a procurator instead of
appearing in person.10 Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis provided that a cleric could be formally
accused of a crime before a secular magistrate and then sent to his bishop for trial; if the bishop
found him guilty, he was expected to depose him from his clerical office and return him to the
magistrate for a sentence. If the bishop found him not guilty, the decision would have to be
confirmed by the magistrate.11
At first the Church was in no position to do otherwise than gratefully accept such gifts as
the emperors chose to bestow. Later the bishops became more vigorous in safeguarding their
legal privileges. Among the councils that claimed some degree of competence for the Church in
legal proceedings involving the clergy were Carthage (397), Mileve (416), Arles (442), and
Chalcedon (451).12 A high point of clerical immunity might be found in Ambrose of Milan, who
asserted that certain ecclesiastical matters were outside the emperor’s purview, such as church
buildings: “Sacred things are not subject to the jurisdiction even of the emperor.”13 He exhorted a

8

Greatly to the chagrin of Augustine as the bishop of Hippo, who lamented the number of hours he was obliged to
devote daily to judicial responsibilities. Frederik van der Meer, Augustine the Bishop: Religion and Society at the
Dawn of the Middle Ages (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 258-62.
9
Constantius (337-361) granted bishops sole competence in accusations against their own members, although this
was phrased as a voluntary delegation of his own authority intended to deter wanton accusations against bishops by
heretics (TC, 16.2.12). Gratianus (375-383) granted civil cases and minor offenses to the bishops’ synods, but
reserved criminal cases to secular authority (TC, 16.2.23). Honorius (395-423) abrogated this last: “Clerics must not
be accused except before bishops” (TC, 16.2.41). Valentinian III (425-455) once again reserved all criminal cases to
the secular courts and decreed that civil cases could only be tried in episcopal courts if both parties agreed (TC, N.
Val. 3.34). Majorianus (457-461) repealed this. See John Emmanuel Downs, “The Concept of Clerical Immunity”
(JCD dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1941), 8-10.
10
TC, N. Val. 3.34.
11
Novellae 123.21, in Corpus Juris Civilis, ed. P. Kreuger and T. Mommsen (Berlin, 1886).
12
Downs, “The Concept of Clerical Immunity,” 9-11.
13
Ambrose to his sister Marcellina, in Saint Ambrose: Letters, trans. Sister Mary Melchior Beyenka, OP, vol. 26 of
Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1954), 367.
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fellow bishop, speaking as Christ: “I…owe nothing to Caesar because I hold nothing of this
world…Peter owes nothing. My apostles owe nothing, because they are not of this world,
although they are in the world.”14 Nevertheless, although Ambrose made bold claims for clerical
immunity from judgments by laymen, he did so not in the context of a judicial setting but with
regards to deposition for heresy.15
Augustine sounded a note of realism a few decades later in his City of God. Augustine’s
outlook was that the Church should anticipate existing within a foreign, even potentially hostile
society up until the end of the world. He echoes Paul in saying that secular authorities should be
respected in matters related to earthly peace, since a peaceful society is a common goal of both
believers and unbelievers. The Church strives as much as possible to respect the “customs, laws,
and institutions” established by various governments, so that “since this mortal condition is
shared by both cities, a harmony may be preserved between them in things that are relevant to
this condition.”16 The Church cooperates with the civil authority and prays for its success,17 but
Augustine does not envision it taking an active role in directing secular government or assuming
its duties. The pilgrim Church has no permanent stake in worldly affairs.
A very famous account of the two spheres of authority in which the Christian moves
simultaneously was articulated by Pope Gelasius I, in a letter to the emperor Anastasius in 494:
Two there are, august emperor, by which this world is chiefly ruled, the sacred
authority of the priesthood and the royal power. Of these the responsibility of the
priests is more weighty in so far as they will answer for the kings of men
14

Ambrose to Justus, in St. Ambrose: Letters, 112.
At the Council of Aquileia (381), which condemned the heretical bishop Palladius, Ambrose stated: “Even if he
be guilty of many impieties, we still blush that it should seem that he who claims the priesthood for himself is
condemned by laymen. Both because of and by this very fact, he who awaits the layman’s sentence must be
condemned, since priests must rather judge concerning laymen.” Gesta concili Aquileiensis, 52; trans. Lester L.
Field, Liberty, Dominion, and the Two Swords: On the Origins of Western Political Theory (Notre Dame, IN: Notre
Dame Press, 1998), 213.
16
Augustine, City of God, XIX.17, trans. Henry Bettenson, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans
(London: Penguin Books, 2003), 877.
17
Augustine, City of God, XIX.26, 891-92.
15
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themselves at the divine judgment. You know, most clement son, that, although
you take precedence over all mankind in dignity, nevertheless you piously bow
the neck to those who have charge of divine affairs and seek from them the means
of your salvation, and hence you realize that, in the order of religion, in matters
concerning the reception and right administration of the heavenly sacraments, you
ought to submit yourself rather than rule, and that in these matters you should
depend on their judgement rather than seek to bend them to your will. For if the
bishops themselves, recognizing that the imperial office was conferred on you by
divine disposition, obey your laws so far as the sphere of public order is
concerned lest they seem to obstruct your decrees in mundane matters, with what
zeal, I ask you, ought you to obey those who have been charged with
administering the sacred mysteries?18
Gelasius portrays the two powers as governing two different aspects of Christian life: the
priests are authorities “concerning the reception and right administration of the heavenly
sacraments,” the emperor regarding “the sphere of public order.” The Christian is answerable to
each one in its domain — in fact, each power is answerable to the other. In a later treatise,
Gelasius emphasizes the healthfulness of this differentiation of the powers:
Christ, mindful of human frailty, regulated with an excellent disposition what
pertained to the salvation of his people. Thus he distinguished between the offices
of both powers according to their own proper activities and separate dignities,
wanting his people to be saved by healthful humility and not carried away again
by human pride, so that Christian emperors would need priests for attaining
eternal life and priests would avail themselves of imperial regulations in the
conduct of temporal affairs…Thus the humility of each order would be preserved,
neither being exalted by the subservience of the other.19
As the first passage makes clear, Gelasius considers the priestly power superior in dignity
because its sacramental ministry has an eschatological role, and the things it stewards are of far

18

Gelasius I, Letter to Anastasius, in The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300, ed. and trans. Brian Tierney
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 13-14.
19
Gelasius I, On the Bond of Anathema, trans. Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 14-15.
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more enduring value.20 Still, this does not diminish the genuine authority of the other power; both
derive from Christ’s own office. The emperor is expected to submit to the priests’ judgment in
things related to the sacraments, but the converse is that it is not only legitimate but salutary for
the clergy to be judged by him in matters of “public order.”
There was little leisure for concern about a unique legal position for the clergy during the
tumultuous centuries between Gelasius and Charlemagne. The disintegration of law and order in
Western Europe lent weight to the presumption that an effective secular authority was necessary
to protect the Church and Christian society. Also, the idea of the secular ruler as judge acquired
further theological legitimacy after the papacy acknowledged Charlemagne and his successors as
Holy Roman Emperors beginning in 800. It was widely understood that the Christian king was
more than a “mere layman;” he stood as the leader of the visible Christian society, and protecting
it from criminal wrongdoers was part of his sacred duty.21
In the meantime, the organizational power of the ecclesiastical hierarchy was valuable as
a unifying force to fledgling empires like Charlemagne’s, and the office of bishop or abbot
became in many places an important position as a feudal landholder. Such officials were
presumed to be subject to their overlord in affairs of land, military service, and so forth, and
accordingly they were accountable to him and his courts if accused of wrongdoing. There were
no exclusively ecclesiastical courts. In the Byzantine and Frankish empires, bishops were
typically judged by their peers (although priests or members of the lower clerical orders were

20

Gerd Tellenbach points out how in Gelasius’s account the priesthood has auctoritas, suggesting a religious
authority, while the empire has only potestas, connoting practical administration. Gerd Tellenbach, Church, State
and Christian Society at the Time of the Investiture Contest, trans. R. F. Bennett (Oxford: Blackwell, 1948), 35.
21
See Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, trans. S. B. Chrimes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1956), esp. pp. 27-60, “Consecration of the Monarch.”
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not), but not in a specifically ecclesiastical forum; the courts overlapped and the same clerics
were officials in both, so it was far from obvious that the Church had charge of the trial.22
Leading up to the turn-of-the-millennium reform movement, the social position of the
clergy was very much bound up with the rest of Christian society, and its authorities were
embedded within royal governing structures. Harold Berman enumerates a number of factors
which contributed to the situation: clerical marriage allowed for political alliances and
inheritances; high-ranking clerics were often important secular officials by virtue of their feudal
positions; much ecclesiastical property was owned by laymen; lay rulers called church councils
and promulgated ecclesiastical law; and last but not least, secular and ecclesiastical courts were
interchangeable. There was a “fusion of the religious and political spheres.”23 The reform
movement would wage war on all of these things. The earlier presumption that the clergy were
subject simultaneously to both temporal and ecclesiastical authorities was one casualty of the
conflict.

III.

Ideals of the Gregorian reform

The so-called Gregorian reform, a capacious concept sometimes dated from the founding
of the monastery of Cluny in 910, was one aspect of a wider movement in Christian Europe
toward general reform at all levels of the Church — a movement which was initiated by lay
rulers in the ninth century, took hold in the monasteries, and reached the papacy relatively late.
One current in particular, associated with Gregory VII’s papacy in the eleventh century,
22

Harold Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1983), 259. In addition, the “False Decretals” forged around 850 in Rheims asserted that a bishop
on trial must have the right to appeal to Rome at any point in the proceedings, but this claim would not be
recognized in practice for some time. Klaus Schatz, Papal Primacy: From Its Origins to the Present (Collegeville,
MN: Liturgical Press, 1996), 70.
23
Berman, Law and Revolution, 88.

9
engendered a distinct ecclesiology and theology of Christian society.24 Its proponents sought to
distinguish the ecclesiastical hierarchy as an independent temporal power in its own right. They
claimed the clergy for their own temporal sovereignty, denying that the clergy owed allegiance
to the authorities of the secular sphere. Among other things, they asserted the clergy’s right to
police its own by maintaining a separate judicial system.
The earliest reformers were prepared to put up with a good deal of control by secular
authorities over the Church’s temporal affairs, since they shared a common goal — the major
moral vices targeted by the reform, simony and clerical marriage, were reprehensible to prelates
and lay Christians alike. The Frankish and German emperors reiterated and enforced the
Church’s prohibitions in these areas. When the papacy arrived relatively late to the party,
beginning with Leo IX’s papacy in 1049, the early papal reform councils focused on “simoniacal
heresy and the evil of clerical marriage.”25 These abuses were attacked passionately as heresies,
but there was no difficulty at first with lay rulers exercising control over papal and episcopal
appointments and other matters of ecclesiastical administration.
However, theological movements were afoot which signaled a more profound change in
the way the Church understood itself in the world. The pursuit of clerical immunity from secular
authority developed in the context of what came to be virtually the slogan of the papal reform,
the “liberty of the Church.”
The medieval concept of libertas, drawing upon church charters and theological treatises
of the early medieval period, meant more than freedom from external compulsion; it was
characterized more as a positive reality than as the mere absence of restraint. In its most

24

On the divergence of the Gregorian reformers’ project from the goals of the wider reform movement, see Gerd
Tellenbach, The Church in Western Europe from the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century, trans. Timothy Reuter
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 293.
25
Adam of Bremen’s account of the Council of Mainz (1049), trans. Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 32.
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fundamental theological sense, liberty was a paradox: it meant the freedom to be a servant of
God, the supreme authority.26 In Paul’s words: “You have become freed from sin and have
become slaves of God.”27 With regards to the law which governed the Christian’s conduct as a
servant of God, liberty was viewed in the context of the complementarity of moral rights and
duties. A given person or entity might have more or fewer responsibilities and hence more or
fewer “liberties.”28 A local church, for instance, might be said to become “more free” when it
was given more extensive faculties to administer the sacraments.29
Leading up to the eleventh century, the clergy were increasingly characterized as being
particularly set apart for servitude under Christ, and for this reason required to be free from other
authorities in order to fulfill their duties as Christ’s servants. Humbert of Silva Candida, one of
the reform-minded cardinals at Rome in the mid-eleventh century, lamented: “They who ought to
be freer than all, whose inheritance is God Himself, and who therefore are the property of God,
are less valued than any others. The lowest serf is subject to his own lord, but the clergy are
expected to serve strange masters.”30
There was increasing conviction that the libertas of the clergy meant freedom from lay
authority, so that the clergy could pursue a divinely appointed mission of governing the visible
Church.31 In practice, when the reformers spoke of the libertas Ecclesiae, they typically meant
the freedom of the ecclesiastical hierarchy to be self-governed, to be ruled by its own laws, and
26

Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian Society, 2.
Rom. 6:22.
28
A distinction from the Roman legal concept of freedom, which sharply distinguished the freedom of persons from
the status of slaves as “things.” Even the least powerful members of medieval society were said to have certain
“liberties.” Ellen Meiksins Wood describes the transition to feudal society as a shift from a black-and-white
free/slave distinction to “a complex continuum of dependent conditions.” Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian
Society, 18-22; Ellen Meiksins Wood, Citizens to Lords: A Social History of Western Political Thought from
Antiquity to the Middle Ages (London: Verso, 2008), 171.
29
Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian Society, 22.
30
Humbert of Silva Candida, Liber contra simoniacos, III.10, trans. Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian
Society, 134-35.
31
Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian Society, 19.
27
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especially to be ruled by the pope. They desired to be free in order to be subject to the highest
authority, Christ himself, and this authority was increasingly seen as residing most fully in the
pope, not in a divinely anointed king.32
The libertas of the clergy entailed corresponding privileges in the thought of the
reformers. In the same way that liberty was no mere absence of restraint, a privilegium was not a
mere exemption from law. It was the practical manifestation of one’s particular liberty, the
means required to exercise one’s proper standing before God and his law.33 A member of the
clergy needed certain privileges to fulfill his particular function. A bishop, for instance, was said
to require the privilege of ruling and administering the lands and possessions that were attached
to his office. Considering the office and its material manifestation as a single entity was a useful
argument against simony, since some had justified the practice of paying for ecclesiastical office
on the grounds that the candidate was purchasing the material possessions of the office, not the
sacramental consecration.34 However, this also made it difficult to maintain the old duality in the
office-holder’s loyalties, to view him as simultaneously subject to distinct ecclesiastical and
secular jurisdictions. The Gregorian reformers eventually objected to all manifestations of this
dual loyalty — they contended that a cleric ought not to be appointed by a lay ruler, hold a
church as the vassal of a lay lord, or formally receive ecclesiastical property from a layman in the
32

As Schatz notes (Papal Primacy, 81-82), not only the diocesan clergy but also the religious orders sought liberty
in being subject to the pope alone. This trend began with the monastery of Cluny, whose charter placed it under the
direct authority of the pope, but was even more dramatically visible with the mendicant orders of the thirteenth
century, whose forms of organization were incompatible with traditional diocesan governance structures.
33
Humbert links the privilege of any possession with the right to pursue its proper use — the privilege of land is
possessing and cultivating it; for a horse, the right to ride upon it; in the case of a position in the Church hierarchy,
such as a bishopric, the privilege includes the right to rule and administer its temporal goods. Tellenbach, Church,
State, and Christian Society, 17.
34
The tenth-century monk Abbo of Fleury criticized those who claimed to be purchasing only the Church’s material
possessions: “It is evident that in the Catholic church the one cannot exist without the other. Or can there be fire
without fuel?” The monk Wido wrote that a local church “cannot exist without its temporalities, as the soul cannot
exist in time without the body.” Humbert of Silva Candida argued that that the one who conferred a bishopric on a
candidate necessarily bestowed an entire indivisible entity, spiritual authority along with temporal administration
over property, and that for this reason it was absolutely unacceptable for a layman to perform the investiture
ceremony. Tellenbach, The Church in Western Europe, 170-77.
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rite of investiture. Ultimately, one of the privileges claimed for the clergy was the privilegium
fori, the privilege of being judged only by fellow clerics. Pope Paschal II defended the claim to
exclusive jurisdiction with Paul’s words: “Who are you to pass judgment on someone else’s
servant?”35
The second and most dramatic phase of the papal branch of the reform, the pontificate of
Gregory VII (1073-1085), discarded entirely the concept of the cleric as subject to two
autonomous spheres of authority. Gregory argued for a supreme, “un-judgeable” temporal
authority exercised by the pope in particular and by the clergy in general. He wrote that it was
part of the nature of the priesthood to judge and condemn earthly authorities, and that the reverse
was a reprehensible sacrilege. The gist of his argument is that since priests enjoy supreme
authority in the administration of the sacraments, it is impossible for them to not have the same
preeminence in earthly affairs:
To whom, then, the power of opening and closing Heaven is given, shall he not be
able to judge the earth? God forbid! Do you remember what the most blessed
Apostle Paul says: “Know ye not that we shall judge angels? How much more the
things that pertain to this life?”36
Gregory took in its most literal sense the old axiom prima sedes a nemine judicatur, “the first see
is judged by no one.”37
Gregory’s most striking (and infamous) rhetoric comes from his defense of the
supremacy of priestly authority, but with regards to the question of clerical immunity from
secular jurisdiction, the more significant issue was the exclusivity of priestly authority in its own
35

Rom. 14:4; Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian Society, 135.
Gregory VII, Letter to Hermann of Metz (1081), trans. Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 68.
37
Prima sedes had been part of the canonical tradition since the fifth century, primarily in the context of the
conundrum of whether a pope could be deposed from his office. It acquired a stronger juridical connotation after
Charlemagne exonerated Pope Leo III of various criminal charges in 800. It was included, along with other robust
assertions of papal supremacy in both ecclesiastical and secular governance, in the eleventh-century Dictatus papae
— a document which cannot be associated with Gregory’s direct authorship but which undoubtedly represents his
ideals. Schatz, Papal Primacy, 73-75.
36
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purview — a purview which was no longer confined to the priest’s sacramental ministry, but
now included every aspect of his life and responsibilities. The question of the cleric’s double
identity as temporal official and ordained minister was the source of the best-known conflict of
the reform period, the Investiture Contest. Gregory and his supporters denied the right of the lay
sovereign to confer authority on a cleric in the investiture ceremony, and more fundamentally,
denied the sovereign’s right to choose the candidate for the office.38 They did not acknowledge
the fact that in much of Europe, a prelate automatically became a temporal ruler by virtue of his
office — as Brian Tierney puts it, “the management of material estates does not become a
spiritual activity simply because bishops are set in charge of them”!39
After the initial heat of the dispute had abated, more pragmatic leaders acknowledged that
in practice the Church’s temporal authority existed alongside others who occupied the same
space. Significantly, the Investiture Contest ended in a compromise which set a precedent for
future turf wars between clerical and secular rulers. Pope Calixtus II and Emperor Henry V
agreed to the Concordat of Worms in 1122. The emperor conceded that bishops would be elected
by the clergy in accordance with ecclesiastical law, but he retained considerable influence over
the choice: the emperor could present a nominee; the election was to occur in his presence
where, in the event of disagreement, he could provide “assent and assistance to the party which
appears to have the better case;” he had veto power, since he could either receive or refuse the

38

As Z. N. Brooke points out, the dispute over investiture, although it has given its name to the colorful battle of
wills between the pope and emperor, was in fact secondary to the issue of control over ecclesiastical appointments.
While Gregory did begin to enforce the formal prohibition against investiture by laymen that had been promulgated
by a Roman synod in 1059, investiture is barely mentioned in the impassioned correspondence between him and
Henry IV. The breach between them had actually begun years earlier with a dispute over who had the right to
appoint a candidate for the archbishopric of Milan. Nevertheless, investiture was a perfect symbol of what was at
stake — who had authority over which aspects of the clerical persona? — and it was on these grounds that the
conflict between the papacy and the empire was temporarily settled. Z. N. Brooke, “Lay Investiture and Its Relation
to the Conflict of Empire and Papacy,” in Church and State in the Middle Ages, ed. Bennett D. Hill (New York:
Wiley, 1970), 90-91.
39
Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 87.
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homage of the elected candidate. The symbols of authority were distinguished: the bishop would
confer the ring and staff, while the emperor’s part of the ceremony would use a royal scepter.
The arrangement acknowledged, both in practice and in the imagery of the ritual, that the clerical
hierarchy and the kingship both had a legitimate claim on the bishop’s loyalty and a legitimate
jurisdiction over him in their own spheres.40
In the years of Gregory’s immediate successors, the papal branch of the reform focused
on practical steps to increase the Church’s standing as a political entity in its own right. It did not
assert authority over all human affairs, but it sought autonomy in the areas which it did claim as
its purview, including oversight of the clergy.41 The project of increasing the Church’s temporal
presence and autonomy did not necessarily reflect the consensus of the Church or even of the
episcopate; however, it influenced the policy of the papacy for the next several centuries, and as
will be seen, it was the worldview that motivated Thomas Becket.

40

Concordat of Worms, trans. Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 91; see also Bennet D. Hill, “The Age of the
Gregorian Reform Movement,” in Church and State in the Middle Ages, ed. Bennett D. Hill (New York: Wiley,
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IV.

Developments in canon law

For the purposes of the debate over clerical immunity, one of the most significant
developments during the century between Gregory and Becket was the crystallization of the new
claims in canon law. Along with the new emphasis on the Church as a temporal reality came the
development of new structures to respond to temporal needs, including the systematization of a
sophisticated body of law to regulate the Church’s internal government in both spiritual and
temporal matters.
The eleventh and twelfth centuries saw a renewed interest in law in general and in its
ability to govern the relationships between various spheres of society, including not only the law
of the institutional Church but also mercantile law, royal law, manorial law, and urban law.42
However, canon law was seen as more than simply one of the many systems on offer. All just
law was understood to participate in the eternal justice of God, but canon law was considered to
have a particularly close relationship to the eternal law: it was based on divine revelation as
found in Scripture and magisterial tradition, and therefore was more reliable than laws
determined by human endeavor. As such, canon law trumped forms of positive law which
originated from merely human wisdom.43 The most significant of the twelfth-century law texts,
Gratian’s Decretum, cites many authorities to argue that “enactments of princes do not stand
above ecclesiastical enactments, but are subordinate to them.” At the same time, secular law is
said to be praiseworthy, especially when it protects the Church, and deserving of obedience so
long as it does not conflict with canon law.44
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Canon law was not new in the Gregorian period, of course; bishops, councils, and popes
had made laws since the time of the apostles, including both “religious” laws about sacramental
discipline and practical rules for life in civil society. The very antiquity of the accumulated
canons was a large part of their authority. What was new was the interest in collecting them,
organizing them, and at times editing them to serve the new ideal of the Church’s temporal
autonomy.45
The most ambitious of the new compilations was the one completed around 1139 by the
Bolognese scholar Gratian, the Concordia Discordantium Canonum, better known in shorthand
as the Decretum. It was so definitive that it put an end to its own genre. Gratian’s work was
remarkable for its effort to synthesize the thousands of canons, reconcile their contradictions, and
derive from them abstract legal norms. It was already ubiquitous and quasi-official by the time of
the Becket dispute twenty years later: the papal chancery presumed its correspondents’
familiarity with it; Alexander III, the pope during Becket’s time, was a respected canonist by
profession and wrote a summa of Gratian’s work; and Becket himself studied the Decretum in
exile and drew upon its authorities to argue for the privileges of the clergy. In particular, two
areas of law covered by the Decretum were directly pertinent to the Becket dispute: the
jurisdiction of ecclesiastical and secular courts over clerics, and relatedly, the extent of the
Church’s capacity to inflict judicial punishment.
Gratian directly addressed clerical immunity in Causa 11 in the second part of his work.
He gives a fictional example in which several clerics sue a fellow cleric in a secular court over a
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property dispute. Gratian then poses a broader question: Should a cleric be tried before a secular
judge?46
Gratian lists authorities on both sides of the question, including popes, councils,
theologians, and even secular lawmakers. The majority prohibit bringing a cleric into a secular
court, although there are also a number which assert the legitimate superiority of secular law in
secular matters. Gratian then provides a dense summary:
By all these things one understands that action should not be brought against
clerics in secular courts, that just as the judges of the Holy Church are
administrators of the things of the church, so also no one except secular judges
should undertake secular matters. And just as he who makes canons has the power
to interpret them, so also should he interpret the secular laws who gives them
force and authority. In criminal causes clerics should not be accused except before
their bishop. This is what was previously established by law and by the canons,
that no cleric should be brought for a criminal cause before a secular judge
without the consent of his bishop; if he will not amend his ways, then he should
be deposed and delivered over to the court.47
Gratian supports clerical immunity by citing various secular laws, including the
Theodosian Code and the Capitularies of Charlemagne, but ultimately he bases it on divine
authority.48 Significantly, he notes the argument that that bishops should be subject to the pope ex
officio and to the king ex possessionibus — the compromise which had quieted the Investiture
Contest, and a position for which he cites no less an authority than Augustine — but he denies
that this means clerics are subject to the king’s courts.49 Instead, he identifies clerics as persons
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set apart from secular jurisdiction, distinct from “secular persons.”50 Clerics are not like ordinary
men, who are subject to both sovereignties; the business of the cleric, whether spiritual or
temporal, is de facto the business of ecclesiastical authority.51
Gratian distinguishes between criminal and civil cases and acknowledges that the latter
have a secular character, since they deal with worldly possessions. Nevertheless, when clerics are
involved, the Church is to judge the case regardless of the nature of the litigation, and the
prohibition against bringing clerics to a secular court applies equally to each situation. At the
same time, Gratian allows for scenarios in each type of case where part or all of the task might be
delegated to the secular courts:
Actions against clerics should not be brought before secular judges, either in civil
or criminal cases, provided that the case is not a civil one which the bishops do
not wish to hear, or a criminal one for which the cleric has been deposed.52
In civil cases, the bishop might waive his right of jurisdiction over the more mundane dealings of
his clergy in favor of a secular court. In criminal cases, in which the cleric’s own person was at
stake, the secular courts could only acquire jurisdiction if the Church chose to expel the cleric
from the canonical clerical state. Gratian does not explicitly describe the circumstances in which
a cleric would be removed from the clerical state, but it seems reasonable to infer that he
envisions this occurring in the situation described in canon 30 above, where the accused cleric
“will not amend his ways” and it is beyond the Church’s power to restrain him.
A closely related question is taken up later in Gratian’s work, the question of judicial
punishment. If the clerical hierarchy is primarily responsible for judging and punishing its own
members, what form ought this punishment to take? It could not simply mirror the practice of the
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secular courts, because the canon law prohibited clerics from imposing corporal punishment.
Gratian cites the Council of Toledo (675), which stated that those responsible for administering
the sacraments could not condemn anyone to a “judgment of blood” such as mutilation or
death.53 Also, physical punishment was considered unseemly for the cleric, who stood in persona
Christi.54 The clerical judges were left with two alternatives. One was to eschew corporal
punishment altogether and rely on non-sanguinary penalties such as fines or imprisonment, or on
ecclesiastical sanctions such as loss of office or of clerical status altogether. The other was to
permit a non-clerical authority to prescribe and carry out the sentence, circumventing the
objection to inflicting punishment on one in persona Christi by first removing the offender from
the clerical state. The latter was fraught with complication because it obliged the ecclesiastical
government to navigate the relationship between its own authority and that of the lay power
intervening on its behalf.
There was a long tradition for regarding coercive punishment as part of the divinely
ordained duty of the secular power, often expressed in terms of the biblical metaphor of the two
swords.55 As noted above, even figures like Paul and Augustine, who were speaking of a not
necessarily Christian government, described the main responsibility of secular authority as
maintaining temporal peace for both Christians and unbelievers. In the eleventh century, the
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Roman cardinal Peter Damian offered this view, reprising Gelasius’s account of the two
complementary powers:
The priesthood is defended by the royal protection while the kingship is sustained
by the holiness of the priestly office. The king is girded with a sword so that he
may go armed against the enemies of the church. The priest devotes himself to
vigils of prayer so that he may win God’s favor for king and people…The former
is established to coerce evil doers and criminals with the punishment of legal
sanctions; the latter is ordained for this, to bind some with the zeal of canonical
rigor through the keys of the church that he has received and to absolve others
through the clemency of the church’s compassion.56
A century later, John of Salisbury articulated the Gregorian corollary of this principle: the king is
“a minister of the priestly power, and one who exercises that side of the sacred offices which
seems unworthy of the hands of the priesthood.”57 Gratian himself cites many authorities to argue
the familiar position that the secular power ought to come to the Church’s aid when physical
force is needed to protect its interests.58
Several passages from the Decretum seemed to imply that the case of a deposed cleric
was one in which the secular power might intervene to accomplish what the Church’s priests
could not themselves do. A number of canons among those cited by Gratian stated that the
deposed cleric should be “delivered over to the court,” traditur curiae. The most familiar
meaning of curia was that of a place or court of law, and during the Becket dispute some
concluded that this meant the cleric should be handed over to a secular court for physical
punishment after his ecclesiastical trial.59 However, this was not the unambiguous consensus of

56

Peter Damian, Letter to King Henry IV (1065), trans. Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 38-39.
John of Salisbury, Policratus, IV.3, trans. John Dickinson, Policratus: The Statesman’s Book of John of Salisbury
(New York: Russell, 1963), 9.
58
Alfons Stickler concluded that Gratian’s terminology distinguishes between secular authorities per se, whom the
Church “exhorts,” and individual laymen, whom the Church can “order” to act on its behalf. Alfons Stickler,
“Magistri Gratiani sentencia de potestate ecclesiae in statum,” Apollinaris 21 (1948), 101.
59
Charles Duggan, “The Becket Dispute and the Criminous Clerks,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research
35 (1962), 8.
57

21
the sources which Gratian cited, especially when considered in their original contexts.60 In
Gratian’s own commentary on the sources, traditur curiae sometimes includes the idea of
consignment to secular justice, he did not directly equate the two. As noted above, Gratian did
foresee the possibility of secular authority taking a hand in the punishment of an accused cleric
in a situation where “the cleric has been deposed,” but the implication of this passage is that this
should occur only at the bishop’s initiative, and as the exception in the case of an incorrigible
offender, not the rule.
In summary, the Decretum lent bite to the reformers’ bark by providing a substantial
body of authorities to support the clerical hierarchy’s right to govern legal proceedings involving
its own members. Gratian allowed that secular authority might have some role in trial and
punishment in certain situations, but not in such a way as to supersede the Church’s primary
right of jurisdiction over members of the clergy.

V.

English precedent for clerical immunity

However vigorously the canons might assert clerical privilege, the Becket conflict
occurred in the context of the English legal and political situation, where the precedent for
clerical immunity was ambiguous.
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Anglo-Saxon law had not recognized a fundamental difference between law for the
clergy and law for the laity, but some distinction was acknowledged. It was generally undisputed
that clergy had a special honored status and deserved particular protection, especially since an
unmarried clergyman was in some sense without the protection of tribe or kin.61 Pastoral
manuals, such as Theodore’s Penitential in the seventh century, commented that clergy ought to
be subject to the judgments of their bishops, but it is not clear whether this meant bishops
exclusively, or exactly what sort of judgment was intended.62 Practically speaking, as long as
there was no exclusively ecclesiastical court system, there was no real separation of jurisdiction;
bishops likely had some involvement in cases involving accusations against their clerics, but
these took place in the same shire and hundred courts to which the rest of England had
recourse.63 As on the Continent, the king made ecclesiastical law regarding clerical discipline;
Alfred’s late ninth-century laws, for instance, directed a bishop to remove from orders a priest
who had committed homicide.64
William the Conqueror became king of England in 1066. He did so with papal approval,
in light of his stated goal of restoring liberty and proper ecclesiastical governance to the Church
in the disorganized country (the irony does not appear to have struck anyone during the later
dispute).65 William set about putting England’s house in order, which entailed among other
things establishing a more efficient judicial system. While William was generally supportive of
the moral aims of the reform, including opposition to simony and clerical marriage, his
administration did not keep pace with Gregorian ideals for clerical privilege in the judicial
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forum. William issued an ordinance establishing a separation of jurisdiction between secular and
episcopal courts:
I have ordained that the episcopal laws shall be amended, because before my time
these were not properly administered in England according to the precepts of the
holy canons. Wherefore I order, and by my royal authority I command, that no
bishop or archdeacon shall henceforth hold pleas relating to the episcopal laws in
the hundred court; nor shall they bring to the judgment of secular men any matter
which concerns the rule of souls; but anyone cited under the episcopal laws in
respect of any plea of crime shall come to the place which the bishop shall choose
and name, and there he shall plead his case, or answer for the crime. He shall not
be tried according to the law of the hundred court, but he shall submit to the
justice of God and his bishop in accordance with the canons and the episcopal
laws. Moreover, if anyone, puffed up with pride, shall refuse to come to the
bishop’s court, he shall be summoned three times, and if, after this, he shall still
fail to appear, he shall be excommunicated; and if the strength and justice of the
king and his sheriff shall be needed to carry this into effect, this support will be
forthcoming.66
The ordinance allocated jurisdiction not based on the status of the individual litigant, but on the
nature of the litigation: cases were separated depending on whether they concerned the
“episcopal laws” or the king’s laws. Notably, William committed himself to backing up the
Church with force if this should be necessary to enforce its judgment — a step that the majority
of European kingdoms did not take (although the legal procedures for this cooperation would not
be fully worked out until the thirteenth century).67
William’s kingship was a theocratic monarchy in which, to quote the contemporary
historian Eadmer, “all things spiritual and temporal alike waited upon the nod of the King.”68 The
papacy’s attempts to regulate ecclesiastical affairs were consistently rebuffed not only by the
monarchy but also by the English episcopate, especially Archbishop Lanfranc of Canterbury,
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who worked hand in glove with the king. Rome tolerated the situation out of sympathy for
William’s efforts to restore law and order, as well as out of fear of jeopardizing England’s
loyalty to the papacy.69 Open schism seemed nearer a generation later when Archbishop Anselm,
whose conscience was more delicate than those of his predecessors, sided with Rome against the
king over the provocative issue of investiture. Happily the king, archbishop, and pope were able
to anticipate the compromise at Worms by some fifteen years: in the Concordat of London in
1107, the king renounced investiture, although he still retained considerable indirect control over
the election and had the right to receive homage from the chosen candidate.70 W. L. Warren
comments on the significance of this compromise:
It meant the abandonment of the attempt at a clear separation of clergy and laity:
henceforth the line of separation was to be drawn instead between the spiritual
and secular aspects of the clerical persona. The sharp distinction between the
Church and the World harboured by the revolutionaries of the Gregorian era now
dimmed, and the clergy found themselves with dual loyalties to Church and State
— loyalties that were demanding but ill-defined.71
Legal jurisdiction was undoubtedly one of the areas that was as yet ill-defined. Although
the Conqueror’s ordinance had reserved criminal cases to the secular courts, in practice the
treatment of jurisdiction over accused clerics was ambiguous. It was notable that Archbishop
Lanfranc had to find a pretext to help William try Bishop Odo of Bayeux for treason — Odo was
said to be liable to a secular trial in his capacity as an earl, not as a member of the clergy. A
similar case was brought against the bishop of Durham during the reign of the next king,
although its outcome is not certain.72 The anonymous Leges Henrici Primi, from the early twelfth
century, states plainly: “The bishops should have jurisdiction of all accusations, whether major
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or minor, made against those in holy orders.”73 Still, it is not obvious whether this is descriptive
or prescriptive, a statement of fact or of ideal.
The English bishops got a taste of libertas during the reign of King Stephen (1135-1154),
when the unsettled political situation prevented the king from taking much oversight of
ecclesiastical affairs and obliged him to make concessions to maintain the bishops’ support. In
his 1136 charter at Oxford, Stephen conceded to the bishops a number of liberties, including
clerical immunity: “Jurisdiction and authority over ecclesiastical persons and over all clerks and
their property, together with the disposal of ecclesiastical estates, shall lie in the hands of the
bishops.”74
A few years later in 1139, the bishops were outraged when the king imprisoned one of
their number, Roger of Salisbury, on charges of treason, without first accusing the bishop in an
ecclesiastical court. The bishops convened to conduct Roger’s trial themselves. The king’s
representative resorted to the justification Lanfranc had supplied fifty years earlier: he claimed
that Roger had not been imprisoned not in his capacity as a cleric but as a royal official. This
time the bishops would have none of it. The bishop of Winchester, Henry of Blois, opened the
discussion by commenting that the imprisonment of bishops by secular rulers used to be a
frequent occurrence, implying that there were different expectations now. He stated that the
charges and investigation should have occurred in an ecclesiastical procedure in accordance with
canon law, not a secular sentence without trial. The trial ended inconclusively after King Stephen
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appealed to Rome, but the bishops’ anger did lasting damage to the king’s political position. The
climate had changed since the days of William and Lanfranc.75
By the time Stephen was succeeded by Henry II in 1154, it was evident that regardless of
who had the better argument in theology or canon law, the English bishops had bitten off far
more than they could chew by assuming responsibility for all clerical jurisdiction in the country.
Their resources were inadequate to deal effectively with the scope of clerical crime. There were
many clerics in England, the vast majority of whom were not priests but members of the minor
orders. For most of them, there was little to distinguish them from laymen in way of life: many
had families to support; the majority were poorly educated and did not possess an ecclesiastical
benefice; supervision or discipline by the bishop was infrequent. The ecclesiastical justice
system was ineffective and handicapped by the canonical prohibition on corporal punishment.76
A Norman cleric, Nicolas of Mont-Rouen, described a conversation he had in 1163 with
King Henry II’s mother, Empress Matilda, in which they assessed the situation together:
Bishops do ordain clerks indiscriminately, without title to churches, from which it
follows that a crowd of ordained men fall into shameful acts through poverty and
idleness. Such a one is not afraid to lose his church, because he is assigned to no
church. He does not fear penalty, because the Church will protect him. He does
not fear the bishop’s prison, for the bishop prefers to let him live unpunished than
take on himself the trouble of feeding and guarding him.77
The chronicler William of Newburgh, writing forty years later, criticized the bishops of
this period for their negligence:
The bishops however, while anxious rather to maintain the liberties or rights of
the clergy than to correct and root out their vices, suppose that they do God
service, and the church also, by defending against established law those
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abandoned clergy, whom they either refuse or neglect to restrain, as their office
enjoins, by the vigour of canonical censure. Hence the clergy, who, called into the
inheritance of the Lord, ought to shine on earth, in their lives and conversation,
like stars placed in the firmament of heaven, yet take licence and liberty to do
what they please with impunity.78
Even when a cleric was brought to judgment, his ecclesiastical trial might well be
perceived as toothless by comparison with its secular counterpart. The ecclesiastical courts
avoided physical methods of obtaining proof, such as ordeal or battle, and most often fell back
on compurgation, in which the accused was required to prove his innocence by supporting his
own declarations with the oaths of others who vouched for his credibility.79
Clerical crime was by no means the only issue in need of housekeeping when Henry II
became king in 1154. In the aftermath of the civil wars during Stephen’s reign, violent crime was
in fact a widespread problem at all levels of society, not just among the clerical class.
Nevertheless, the situation was still deplorable, and the idea of atrocities committed by members
of the clergy was, as it is today, particularly scandalous.

VI.

Becket’s arguments for clerical privilege

At this point, the stage was set for the conflict between Henry II and Thomas Becket. It
was not like the debate between Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV a century earlier, when both
sides supported their positions with passionate theological arguments. In this case the theology
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was one-sided, supplied almost exclusively by Becket, and none of it was original to him.
However, the dispute over clerical immunity was a playing out of the implications of the new
vision of the clergy’s position in society: the Gregorian ideal of a self-governing clerical
hierarchy had to come to terms with the realities of existing in a society whose ruler had a
legitimate duty to protect his realm.80
Henry II was crowned king of England in 1154, but wars in his continental lands kept
him away from England for much of the first decade of his reign. During this period, several
incidents exposed the drawbacks of regarding the clergy as self-policing and unaccountable to
secular authority.
Late in Stephen’s reign, a cleric of the diocese of York, the archdeacon Osbert, was
charged with murdering his own archbishop. Osbert claimed that as a cleric, he could only be
tried by the Church. Stephen disagreed on account of the magnitude of the crime, but when
Henry became king he consented with misgivings to allow the ecclesiastical courts to handle the
case. The results cast no credit on the Church. The case dragged on for a year without either
proving or disproving Osbert’s guilt, and when Osbert was at last ordered to support his
innocence by compurgation, he promptly appealed to Rome and the entire process was derailed
(a situation which is unfortunately familiar in modern canon law as well). The ecclesiastical
courts had not yet developed procedures that would permit the effective administration of justice
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in accordance with the principles of canon law. Even the then-Archbishop of Canterbury,
Theobald, blamed the miscarriage of justice on “the subtlety of the law and the canons.”81
In addition to Osbert’s case, the trial of an alleged blackmailer in 1158 was frustrated by
the invocation of clerical privilege. The king objected, but he was called away from the country
before he could organize a secular trial.82 The following year a counterfeiter in Normandy was
released from prison on account of his clerical status, although he still had to forfeit his
possessions and go into exile.83
Henry settled his affairs on the Continent and returned to England in 1163. Restoring
effective royal administration, including reforming the judicial system, was now one of his chief
priorities. In the matter of clerical crime, he no doubt anticipated the assistance of Thomas
Becket, lately his chancellor and now the newly appointed Archbishop of Canterbury.
The king heard complaints about the ineffectiveness of ecclesiastical judgments,
including the allegation that over a hundred murders had been committed by clerics since his
coronation.84 When the king attempted to prosecute three of the worst crimes, Becket quickly
intervened to retrieve the accused clerics for the Church. Becket was not insensitive to the fact
that the ecclesiastical courts were perceived as scandalously lenient, and he felt the need to
impose a less toothless punishment than the loss of clerical status.85 However, he proceeded to
antagonize both the king and his fellow bishops by imposing a sentence of banishment on one
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cleric and branding on another, both of which overstepped royal prerogatives and the latter of
which affronted the canonical prohibition on corporal punishment.86 In the months that followed,
there were several more clashes between the king and the new archbishop over areas in which
Becket had contravened the law of the land.87
The question of jurisdiction over clerics was finally raised in the open at a council in
Westminster in October 1163. Henry told the eleven English bishops that clerics convicted of
major crimes ought to be “deprived of the protection of the Church” and turned over to royal
officers for corporal punishment. He argued that physical punishment was more likely to deter
future crime, and that its severity was appropriate since the clergy ought to be held to a higher
standard of moral conduct. Unexpectedly, he also presented an argument from canon law: his
advisers cited canons from Gratian’s Decretum which included the concept of traditio curiae,
interpreting these to mean that the accused cleric was to be handed over to the secular court for
physical punishment after his ecclesiastical trial. Henry’s proposal was an abrupt departure from
the status quo, but it was in some ways a limited one: the king did not demand that the cleric be
tried in a secular court, but only that the secular court should administer the punishment after the
Church had found fault; nor was he claiming jurisdiction over every offense, but only over major
crimes which presumably involved a more dangerous suspect. The proposal resembled the
process outlined in the Corpus Juris Civilis, where a bishop could judge a cleric guilty, deprive
him of clerical orders, and return him to the regular court for sentence.88
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Becket delivered a lengthy rejoinder to the king. According to one eyewitness, he argued
on theological grounds that the king had no right to assert jurisdiction over the clergy. He
described two distinct spheres of legitimate authority within the Church:
My lord king, sacrosanct Church, mother of all kings and priests, has two kings,
two laws, two jurisdictions and two penalties. Two kings, Christ the heavenly
king and the earthly king; two laws, human and divine; two jurisdictions, priestly
and lay; and two means of coercion, spiritual and corporal.89
With regards to governance of the clergy, the two spheres do not overlap: “Kings have no
jurisdiction in these things.” The clergy are set apart entirely for their own law:
Clerics, by reason of order and office have Christ alone as king…And since under
their own king, the King of heaven, not worldly kings, they are ruled by their own
law, and if they transgress, are penalized by their own law, which has its own
penalty.90
As for the suggestion that clerics be subjected to corporal punishment, Becket appealed to
the dignity of the priesthood; he protested that the body which performs a sacred office at the
altar should not be disfigured or humiliated, “lest in man the image of God should be
deformed.”91 He denounced the combination of degradation from orders and corporal punishment
as a kind of double jeopardy, saying that “God does not judge twice in the same matter.”92 He

89

Herbert of Bosham, MTB III.268, trans. Staunton, Thomas Becket and His Biographers, 104. Herbert says that he
is not reproducing Becket’s speech verbatim but that he has captured its substance. Some of the other contemporary
biographies rather unconvincingly portray Becket delivering a full canonical argument with extensive quotations
from the Decretum, but in the case of Herbert’s account, it is much more credible that Becket could have given
something like this rebuttal off the cuff. As Staunton notes, another contemporary source records that Becket gave a
sermon before the king several months earlier in which he discussed the distinction between the royal and priestly
“kingdoms.”
90
Herbert of Bosham, MTB III.268, trans. Staunton, Thomas Becket and His Biographers, 104.
91
Warren, Henry II, 467.
92
The objection to double punishment was unusual, but Becket was not the first person to make the argument in his
day. It originated from a phrase in Jerome’s commentary on the prophet Nahum. Duggan, “The Becket Dispute and
the Criminous Clerks,” 15-18.

32
argued that the traditio curiae texts referred to degradation from clerical orders, not punishment
by a secular court of law.93
Henry made no attempt to refute this manifesto on theological or canonical grounds. He
fell back on an appeal to the fact that secular jurisdiction over clerics had been the norm for
much of England’s recent history. He requested each bishop to swear a general oath promising to
uphold the “customs” of the past. Led by Becket, the bishops consented to take the oath in
conditional language only, with the caveat that they would observe the customs “saving their
order.”94
Henry, having failed to obtain a general promise from the bishops, resorted to specifying
the prerogatives he wished to secure. In the weeks following Westminster, Becket was persuaded
by a papal mission and his fellow bishops to offer a personal pledge to the king that he would
obey the customs of the realm, without the provocative clause about his order. The king, not
satisfied, summoned the bishops to a council at Clarendon in January 1164.95 The bishops arrived
apparently under the impression that they would be called upon to echo Becket’s expression of
loyalty in a general form. To their dismay, they found themselves confronted with a demand that
they take an unconditional oath to observe a carefully defined list of “customs,” the Constitutions
of Clarendon.
The list Henry presented at Clarendon has been preserved in a form which indicates
which of the sixteen propositions were condemned or tolerated by Pope Alexander III. They
outlined various prerogatives of the king in areas of intersection between ecclesiastical and royal
government. R. H. Helmholz categorizes the canons by three objectives: defining jurisdiction in
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matters such as advowson, oaths, and clerical crime; regulating legal procedures used in the
ecclesiastical courts; and asserting the king’s rights regarding episcopal actions such as elections,
travel, and excommunications.96 Some of them, such as a canon about homage to the king by a
newly appointed bishop, merely confirmed the status quo, but others, such as a prohibition on
appeals to Rome without the king’s consent, meant a contravention of canon law that had not
been hitherto required in the bishops’ lifetimes. In particular, canon 3 articulated a new policy
for jurisdiction over clerics:
Clerks charged and accused of any offence, when summoned by the king’s
justice, shall come to the king’s court to answer there concerning what seems to
the king’s court ought to be answered there, and in the ecclesiastical court for
what seems ought to be answered there, but in such a way that the justice of the
king sends men into the court of Holy Church to see in what way it is tried there.
And if the clerk should be convicted or confesses, the Church ought no longer to
protect him.97
The wording of the canon is notoriously vague (“what seems ought to be answered
there”) and lacks the precision typical of Henry’s laws. The most commonly accepted
interpretation is the following: every cleric accused of a crime was to be formally accused before
a royal justice and then sent to the Church for trial, where the proceedings would occur in the
presence of a royal official; and if the accused were found guilty, he was to be returned
immediately to the royal justice for a sentence of corporal punishment.98
Certain elements of this scenario were palatable from the point of view of canon law: the
ecclesiastical court retained the trial, there was no mention of the controversial traditio curiae;
the Church was exonerated of double jeopardy and of blood punishment insofar as it had no
involvement in the final sentence. In fact, if the law had envisioned this as a procedure to be
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followed in exceptional cases when the Church found itself unable to restrain a particularly
contumacious offender, this would have corresponded to the approach described in Gratian’s
Decretum. However, if the king intended this to be the de facto manner of proceeding, that the
ecclesiastical trial was to take place under the oversight of his own officials, and that his court
would be able to issue a sentence of blood punishment in every case — and considered in light of
the rest of the document, this interpretation is the more likely — it was clearly at odds with the
letter and the spirit of canon law.99
Becket and the rest of the bishops were appalled by the canons. While canon 3
represented the issue which had sparked the situation, many of the other canons struck at the
same root — the question of whether the Church was answerable to any secular power for the
regulation of its own affairs — and were objectionable to the bishops for that reason. Even those
among them who were sympathetic to the king’s concerns on specific issues had good reason to
hesitate before swearing an unconditional oath to a number of propositions in direct
contradiction with canon law, whose rigid specificity left little room for further negotiation.100
The bishops deliberated for days, and how they made up their minds is not clear. Gilbert
Foliot, the bishop of London, provided the account written soonest after the event, and he
described all the bishops standing united against the Constitutions until Becket suddenly
capitulated and announced that he would perjure himself.101 Some of Becket’s biographers
thought that he had yielded to threats of imprisonment or death. Becket did eventually agree,
without explaining himself or consulting the other bishops, to take the oath, and to accept a
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chirograph of the document, signifying his assent. Whatever his decision was, it was one for
which he immediately professed remorse. Immediately after leaving Clarendon he repudiated his
oath, donned penitential garb, and abstained from celebrating Mass; and he certainly did not
slacken his opposition to the king’s position on clerical crime.102
Within the next nine months, Becket’s relations with the king deteriorated so far that he
was forced into exile. Henry brought a spurious accusation against Becket for embezzlement,
apparently intending to inflict the maximum humiliation by involving him in the very sort of
secular trial against which he had taken his original stand.103 Becket was given no opportunity for
a proper legal defense, and he left the trial before hearing his sentence, denying the capacity of
the king’s barons to pass judgment on him as a bishop: “I am your father, while you are nobles of
the palace, lay potentates, secular persons. I will not hear your judgment.”104 Becket fled to
France the next day, beginning six years of exile marked by diplomatic fencing among the king,
the archbishop, and the papal curia. Becket would carry on the dispute not in person but in his
letters to both friends and enemies.

VII.

Becket’s elaboration of his position in his correspondence

During his exile in France, Becket had leisure to elaborate on his ideological position by
studying theology and especially canon law.105 Becket’s correspondence presents a valuable
contemporary record of his own views, unlike the later hagiographies heavily influenced by
reverence for him as a martyr. His letters provide further context for his stand on the question of
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clerical immunity and similar clerical privileges. Even if clerical immunity meant a departure
from English custom, Becket considered it to be an accurate reflection of the supremacy of
ecclesiastical power, whose ministers stood outside the purview of secular authority. Their
immunity was not merely a fitting state of affairs but part of the Church’s essence, the fruit of
Christ’s passion.
Notably, one argument that Becket did not seriously attempt was an appeal to tradition
for clerical immunity. On the one hand, early in the conflict, he certainly portrayed the situation
as an unprecedented, even apocalyptic assault on the English church. Writing to Pope Alexander
immediately after the tense scene at Westminster in October 1163, Becket painted a picture of
descending chaos and storm. He wrote that “neither the decrees of the holy fathers nor the laws
of the canons, whose very name is detested among us, can now protect even the clergy, who have
been exempt hitherto from their jurisdiction by a special privilege” (apparently a reference to the
concession in King Stephen’s 1136 charter).106 In an accompanying letter to a member of the
papal court, he wrote:
The liberty of Holy Church is being attacked here in so many ways that we can
scarcely bear to see or hear them. Every day new things come forward and
demands unheard-of in previous ages are made. The Law is silenced, and the rule
of the canons is denied to the fellowship of the Lord; clergy are subjected to new
laws and tossed about at the pleasure of the lay power.107
Becket evidently believed Henry to have a particular vendetta against ecclesiastical liberty; in all
his letters preserved over the six years of his exile, there are few that lack a reference to the king
as a roaring lion seeking to subjugate the Church.
However, as seen from the English legal history traced above, absolute clerical immunity
did not have precedent in England farther back than a few decades, and Becket implicitly
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conceded this by declining to argue to the contrary. At no point in the course of the debate did
Becket or his supporters attempt to prove that any specific tenet in the Constitutions of
Clarendon contradicted the “ancient customs of the realm.”108
Instead, like his predecessors in the Gregorian movement, Becket characterized his
position not as restoring a previous golden age of liberty, but as working toward a new just
ordering of society. He and his friends recalled the saying of Gratian, who was in turn quoting
Augustine: “The Lord said in the Gospel, ‘I am the Truth.’ He did not say, ‘I am custom.’ And
so, when truth has become manifest, let custom yield to truth.”109 In exile, Becket shifted from
protesting that the royal demands were unprecedented to denouncing them as longstanding but
nonetheless evil abuses. He wrote to Empress Matilda about the Constitutions of Clarendon: “If
former kings sought them, they ought not to have sought them.”110 To Pope Alexander, he
described the Constitutions as “customs, or rather perversions, which are not only opposed to the
canons and the laws, but wholly inimical to the Gospel of Christ.”111 Finally, he warned the king
himself: “The Lord says, ‘Keep my laws’; and again, he declares through the Prophet, ‘Woe to
them who make unjust laws and set down injustices in writing to oppress the poor in judgment
and deprive God’s humble people of their right.”112
Becket’s fullest statement on his ideal of “right order in the world,” in Gerd Tellenbach’s
phrase, is found in three letters addressed to the king in the summer of 1166. Becket explained
his motivation for these letters as fatherly solicitude for the correction of an erring son. In them
he describes his view of the clergy’s place in Christian society.
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Becket’s position on the two powers is Gregory VII’s: “It is certain that kings receive
their power from the Church, and the Church receives hers not from them but from Christ.” The
Church is composed of “the clergy and the people.” Clerics have authority to “conduct
ecclesiastical affairs so that they may direct the whole to the salvation of souls,” while secular
princes “have the ability to conduct secular affairs, that they may bring the whole to the peace
and unity of the Church.” Since secular rulers derive their authority from the Church, they have
no power, among other things, to “draw clergy to secular judgments.”113
Becket described the king’s responsibility as maintaining peace and unity; but clearly he
did not consider clerics part of this concern, as he expressed in his third and most severe letter to
Henry. In this letter, Becket was particularly dependent on Gratian for his authorities.114 He
recalled the famous account of the two powers from Gelasius, although he omitted the
qualification that the priesthood’s supremacy relates to sacramental ministry. 115 He cited
additional excerpts attributed to Gelasius: “Priests should never be judged except by the Church,
nor is it for human laws to lay a sentence on such men;”116 and, “in fact it was always the law that
judgments relating to priests came from priestly council. For no matter what kind of priests they
are, even if they should fall into human error, it is never thought that they can or should be
smitten by the secular power, as long as they do not go beyond the bounds of the faith.”117 He
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recalled the anecdote related of Constantine, who said that a cleric was “reserved to the judgment
of God alone” and “cannot be judged by anyone” — “meaning,” Becket added, “a secular
judge.”118 He observed that it was unfitting to pass judgment on priests not only because of their
roles as the fathers, teachers, and guides of secular authorities, but because they particularly
represent the persona Christi.119 Becket nowhere addressed the possibility that members of the
clergy might themselves pose a danger against which the Church might require the protection of
secular power.
The firmness of Becket’s position can be attributed in part to the fact that for him, as for
other reformers, the temporal autonomy of the Church was not merely a congenial state of
affairs. The libertas Ecclesiae was essential to the Church, part of the patrimony of Christ’s
redemption. Not only did Becket remind the king that “Christ founded the Church and purchased
her freedom with his blood,” but he wrote also to Empress Matilda that the Passion obtained the
“privileges and dignities” of the Church.120 He told a friend that “the case which [the king]
conducts against us is between him and God, because we seek nothing more from him than what
the eternal God left to his Church as an everlasting testament, when he took flesh for her sake.”121
To his fellow bishops, he described the libertas Ecclesiae as “the soul of the Church,” “without
which the Church can neither live nor have strength.”122 He saw a close connection between
Christ’s passion on the cross and the present struggle: he exhorted the bishops, “Let us die with
him; let us lay down our lives to liberate his Church from the yoke of slavery and the affliction
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of the oppressor — the Church which he founded, whose freedom he bought with his own
Blood.”123
Before moving on from Becket’s own expressions of his views, it is revealing to compare
his position to the opinions of his contemporaries in the ecclesiastical world. Becket has been
portrayed as taking a radical position on the question of clerical immunity in particular and of
ecclesiastical liberty in general, of regressing to “pure Gregorianism” and ignoring a century of
development and nuance since the bald assertions of the Dictatus papae. Certainly Becket
frequently portrayed himself as the lone defender of truth contra mundum. In fact, Becket’s
theology was no more extreme than that of other prominent churchmen of his day; it was his
inflexibility in its practical application that alienated him from his contemporaries.
Clerical immunity itself was widely supported by the English hierarchy. As noted above,
it had been the accepted status quo for thirty years before Becket became archbishop. All the
English bishops had resisted the king’s demands at Westminster, and again at Clarendon before
Becket ordered them to follow his own capitulation. In addition, they remained united against
further restrictions on ecclesiastical government which the king attempted to impose in 1169.124
Pope Alexander considered several propositions of the Constitutions of Clarendon to be at least
tolerable, but the one relating to jurisdiction over clerics he specifically condemned.125
As for the underlying ideology of ecclesiastical autonomy, Alexander, who was in
general tactful and diplomatic, did not scruple to write to Henry in 1166:
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As the clergy are distinguished from the laity in manner of life and dress, so also
is clerical jurisdiction wholly distinct from lay jurisdiction. Wherefore if you
improperly subvert this ordering of society, and if, usurping to yourself the
powers which belong to Jesus Christ, you establish new rules oppressive to the
churches and the poor in Christ at your pleasure, introducing, even, those customs
which you call ancestral, you yourself will, at the unescapable last judgment, be
undoubtedly judged in like manner…It is not only decent for you but also
expedient not to confound Church and State.126
The ablest spokesman of the conservative tendency among the English episcopate was
the bishop of London, Gilbert Foliot, a scholar and canonist who became Becket’s ecclesiastical
nemesis during his six years of exile. Foliot rebuked Becket in his powerful letter Multiplicem
nobis, where he stated the theological case for the secular power having a legitimate stake in the
Church’s temporal interests. He pointed out that not every privilege of the Church derives from
divine law or the fruits of the Redemption, but that “by human law the Church possesses many
things which have been bestowed upon her by the grant of men alone,” and that the clergy are
subject to the human rulers who are responsible for human law.127 His articulation of the Gelasian
“two powers,” unlike Becket’s, does justice to the parity expressed in the original:
Therefore, since there is a twin power from God, one sacerdotal, the other royal,
they confirm by the authority of the fathers that each takes precedence of the other
according to its nature, and can be judged by the other according to its nature.128
If anyone could be expected to support the king’s right to judge a priest in temporal
matters, it seems that it would be Foliot — but even Foliot upheld clerical immunity. At the
height of the tension between king and episcopate in 1169, Foliot wrote to the king,
reprimanding him for having apprehended two clerics and tactfully insisting that they be turned
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over to the Church for trial.129 The fact that a prelate as erudite and articulate as Foliot (and one
who personally disliked Becket) agreed with Becket on the issue for which he had taken his
original stand, implies the breadth of its acceptance among the English clergy.
Where Becket actually diverged from his fellow bishops, and where he drew their
particular criticism, was his failure to adopt the attitude of tactful compromise and restraint
which had characterized his predecessors’ relationships with previous kings. Becket lacked a
spirit of long-sighted forbearance and the recognition that ideals must sometimes give way in
practice, an attitude which had been implicit in the English compromise over investiture and later
in the Concordat of Worms. By one account, Becket told the bishops at Westminster that there
was no need to seek a compromise with the king, because Christ would come to the aid of his
bride; he upbraided them for wishing to “make allowance for the evil of these times.”130 On the
other hand, Becket’s fellow bishop Arnulf of Lisieux urged him not to wrangle with the king
over legal details and reminded Becket that there was no shame in promising reverence and
obedience to a legitimate king.131 Gilbert Foliot believed that the battle of wills at Clarendon
could have been avoided; he argued that Henry was not absolutely opposed to negotiation over
the prerogatives he claimed and that a tactful approach could have placated him without defying
him outright.132 Foliot reminded Becket that longstanding customs could not be done away with
at a blow and recalled previous bishops who secured concessions for the Church by patience and
diplomacy: “These men would have achieved little or nothing if they had rushed to take up
weapons.”133 As the nineteenth-century historian Frederic William Maitland said of the English
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bishops: “Popes, and popes who were no weaklings, had taught them by precept and example
that when we are dealing with temporal power we may temporise.”134
In summary, Becket viewed Christian society as divided into two spheres of jurisdiction,
with the clergy falling unequivocally under their own temporal governance as an extension of the
liberty gained for the Church by Christ’s passion. Many of his contemporaries shared his ideal of
a self-policing clerical class, but Becket differed from them in his rejection of the attitude of
pragmatic compromise which had achieved earlier victories for ecclesiastical autonomy.

VIII. Resolution of clerical immunity in England

After Becket’s death, the dispute over clerical immunity was resolved in favor of the
Church’s right to self-governance over clerics, but with compromises that implicitly admitted the
inevitability of some role for secular authority in a matter which concerned the public good.
The circumstances leading up to Becket’s murder had almost nothing to do with the
issues surrounding clerical immunity, which in fact receded into the background during the last
few years of the controversy. When the king and the archbishop were at last formally reconciled
in the summer of 1170, they did not even attempt to plaster over their original disagreement —
the Constitutions of Clarendon were passed over in complete silence.135 A few months later,
policy questions were temporarily forgotten in the international horror over the murder of the
archbishop.
Clerical immunity was not discussed at the first and largely symbolic meeting between
the king and the papal legates at Avranches in May 1172. The legates prescribed acts of
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repentance for the king and made provisions for restitution to those who had suffered on
Becket’s behalf. The only item of discussion directly related to the Constitutions was that the
king agreed to not prohibit appeals to Rome, although he could still require security from anyone
whose appeal appeared detrimental to royal interests. Significantly, Henry was not made to
repudiate Clarendon himself before being reconciled with the Church; he was only asked to
release the bishops from their oath. The open-ended nature of the truce implied that the
remaining issues were to be worked out in further negotiations, as the matter of appeals had
been. Evidently Pope Alexander did not mean to stand inflexibly on principle.136
The specific provisions of Clarendon were addressed in the second round of negotiations
in 1175-1176, where clerical immunity was discussed along with other clerical privileges. The
king agreed to consign jurisdiction over clerics to the ecclesiastical courts. However, the pope
agreed to an exception with regards to offenses committed against the forest law, an area of great
importance to the king.137 The king conceded in principle that he did not have absolute right over
the Church’s temporal interests in his realm, and particularly over the person of the cleric;
however, the forest law exception granted him a good deal of the jurisdiction he had wanted
anyway.138
For the next phase of English history, the Church’s judicial autonomy regarding the
clergy resembled Becket’s ideal. When a cleric was arrested for a felonious offense, he would be
confined in the bishop’s prison, the Church would formally “claim” him before the king’s
justices, and the ecclesiastical court would proceed to its own trial, which usually consisted of
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compurgation.139 The division of duties proposed at Clarendon, wherein a cleric would be tried
by the ecclesiastical court and punished by the secular court, never caught on. Rome tended to
regard ecclesiastical penalties, like suspension from office or loss of clerical status, as
sufficiently severe. Occasionally the courts resorted to non-sanguinary punishments such as
imprisonment in the bishop’s prison or in a monastery.140 At first Pope Alexander III concurred
with Becket’s objection to double punishment (At si clerici, 1178). Later, Innocent III made
provisions for situations in which a cleric might be degraded and handed over to secular
punishment (Novimus expedire, 1209), but as Gratian had envisioned, it was a decision left to
ecclesiastical authority, and the Church was expected to ensure that capital punishment did not
occur.141
In practice, clerical immunity was subject to certain limitations. In addition to the forest
law exception, clerical immunity came to be only applied to felonies, and minor offenses could
still be prosecuted.142 Certain transgressions, such as illicit marriage, could result in a loss of
privilege.143 Unlike some places on the Continent, the English church enjoyed immunity in
criminal cases only; civil cases continued to be allocated based on the nature of the litigation.144
The English bishops complained occasionally that the canon law was not being respected in its
entirety, but by and large they maintained a spirit of pragmatic compromise — from which
Becket had been an anomaly — and did not rush to provoke the English crown over every
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transgression. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) even warned clerics against trespassing on
secular jurisdiction in the name of the libertas Ecclesiae.145
At the same time, ecclesiastics recognized that if they were to be credibly self-governing,
there must be an end to the situation lamented by Empress Matilda, where bishops refused to
prosecute clerics because they did not want to take the trouble of imprisoning them, and of cases
like Archdeacon Osbert’s, where a lack of legal sophistication impeded the timely administration
of justice. Pope Alexander III was the first pope to order bishops to conduct a formal judicial
investigation of clerical crime. The Fourth Lateran Council reiterated: “We decree that prelates
of churches should prudently and diligently attend to the correction of their subjects’ offenses,
especially of clerics, and to the reform of morals. Otherwise the blood of such persons will be
required at their hands.”146 The council established the inquisitorial procedure of gathering proof
to improve the effectiveness of criminal trials.147
Overall, although the manner in which clerical immunity was implemented in practice
was more circumscribed than Thomas Becket would have thought decent, it broadly
corresponded to the principles of ecclesiastical autonomy and priestly dignity which he had
expounded.
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IX.

Postscript

The Catholic Church in the last several decades, and in our local archdiocese very
recently, has also experienced the scandal of clerical crime. As in Becket’s time, the problem is
not unique to the clergy, but it is particularly painful to find it among those who hold a position
of trust and moral authority in the Church. The greatest scandal has been caused when superiors
have chosen not to approach secular law enforcement for judgment of accused priests, a course
of action which is often interpreted as condoning and exacerbating the original crime.
On the one hand, unlike the situation in Becket’s time, the American church is in no
position to exercise a judicial system on par with secular civil law. Although certain concurrent
jurisdictions are still officially recognized in the civil forum (military law, for instance), the
Church is not one of them and cannot rely on physical coercion to enforce its laws. On the other
hand, Becket’s ideal of a protected jurisdiction for the clergy is in some ways still implicit in
canon law. The 1917 Code of Canon Law affirmed clerical immunity and prescribed penalties
for anyone who compelled a cleric to come before a secular court.148 The current Code, in effect
since 1983, omits this canon and is silent on the question of involving clerics in secular legal
proceedings. With regards to child sexual abuse specifically, the twentieth-century Holy See
directives on the canonical prosecution of this crime reinforced the impression of a selfgoverning clerical class with exclusive competence over its own: to try an accusation against a
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priest, every member of the judicial process also had to be a priest, and the solemn obligations of
confidentiality suggested the avoidance of civil law involvement.149
One revealing anecdote comes from the scandal in the Archdiocese of Dublin. In
November 1994, a priest canonist of the Archdiocese wrote a letter to his archbishop in which he
expressed his frustration at the way the situation was unfolding:
It is my opinion that there is a gross over-reaction on the part of many of our
Church authorities to this whole “paedophile crisis.” I heard the Cardinal [Cahal
Daly] on yesterday’s radio specifically saying that, if there is a reasonable
suspicion against a priest in this area, he should be turned over to the police for
investigation and for whatever may follow from that. This is panic; it is also
wrong. It takes no account whatever of the Church’s own canonical procedures in
dealing with situations of this kind — procedures which long have been
acknowledged and accepted by the civil courts. There is, in my view, a real
danger in all of this that some of the local churches may, unthinkingly, try to
solve their problems at the risk of abandoning the autonomy which the Code of
Canon Law, now clearly based on Vatican II, has established for the Church
itself.150
This view, and in general the ecclesiastical approach to clerical sexual abuse which seems
to have occurred in many cases — where an accused cleric was tried in secret or more often
merely rebuked, and then quietly relocated — smacks of Becket’s defense at Westminster:
“Clerics, by reason of order and office, have Christ alone as king…And since under their own
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king, the King of heaven, not worldly kings, they are ruled by their own law, and if they
transgress, are penalized by their own law, which has its own penalty.”
It is premature to conclude based on anecdotal evidence that Becket’s convictions were
the primary motivation for modern-day bishops and religious superiors to choose to deal with
clerical crime in-house. For one thing, many religious institutions, not just the Catholic Church,
have taken this attitude toward criminal behavior among their leadership.151 Still, it is difficult not
to note the congeniality of Becket’s ideals to such an approach. If there is any lesson to be drawn,
it might be one of caution against an attitude of regarding civil law as a hostile intruder in a
rightfully ecclesiastical domain. It is a modest positive sign that the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith has recently encouraged bishops’ conferences to prioritize cooperation with
civil law when dealing with cases of alleged abuse, although the Holy See has yet to issue a
document on this issue which speaks of civil law as a positive force for justice.152

X.

Conclusion

Early Christianity presumed that the clergy were subject to both ecclesiastical and secular
law, and that the punishment of crime belonged to the purview of secular authority. During the
Gregorian reform movement, the advocates of a new ecclesiology argued for a clerical hierarchy
which was not answerable to any secular authority, and the newly systematized canon law
provided the theological basis for a clerical class which was exclusively self-policing in criminal
law. Thomas Becket attempted to carry the Gregorian ideals of ecclesiastical autonomy and
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priestly dignity to their logical conclusion by establishing clerical immunity as a political reality;
both in personal debate and later in his correspondence, he argued that no secular authority was
competent to impose trial or punishment on a member of the ordained clergy. After his death, the
English church succeeded in establishing much of the exclusive self-jurisdiction for which he
had contended. Becket’s ideals about the relationship of the clergy to the rest of Christian society
are a caution as the Church begins to work toward healing from the scandal of clerical sexual
abuse.
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